Nil Votes, Missing Floors: Reading IBBI’s Personal Guarantor Proposals Against the Subhash Chandra Litigation
Author- Samriddhi Kapadnis, BBA. LLB. student, Symbiosis Law School, Nagpur

ABSTRACT
On 12 September 2026, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) issued a discussion paper proposing four safeguards for the insolvency resolution process of personal guarantors to corporate debtors. It follows the proceedings against Essel Group founder Subhash Chandra, where an NCLT Third Member approved on 25 August, subject to excluding certain unsupported claims, a repayment plan offering ₹6.25 crore to creditors against admitted claims of ₹22,006.57 crore. On 1 September a five-member Special Bench stayed that order, and on 23 September it sought the CBI’s response within four weeks. Comments on the paper close on 3 October.
This analysis argues that the proposals address genuine gaps but leave important questions unresolved, and that the litigation shows where. First, the vote exclusion in Proposal 1 relies on a definition carrying the very ambiguity that divided the Tribunal. Second, the paper gives dissenting creditors more information but no entitlement, in a process where a plan approved by more than three-fourths in value of creditors present and voting may, once approved by the Tribunal, bind creditors who dissented. Existing commentary, such as Vinod Kothari Consultants’ note, focuses on asset preservation.
The Regulatory Gap: Benchmarking Personal Guarantor Insolvency Against CIRP
The paper’s method is benchmarking. It sets the guarantor regulations beside the corporate insolvency (CIRP) regulations and imports what is missing: a nil voting share for a guarantor’s “related party”; a duty on the resolution professional (RP) to examine avoidance transactions before the vote; independent valuation of the guarantor’s assets; and recorded creditor reasons, with specific reasons where the payout is “significantly lower” than claims or realisable value. My method is to test each proposal against the statutory text and the 144-page 25 August order, which records the vote and the members’ competing reasoning.
The Chandra Proceedings: When Creditor Classification Matters
The order records that the plan carried 80.814 per cent of the vote. Five entities (Veena Investments, Direct Media Distribution Ventures, World Crest Advisors, Lemonade Capital Advisors and Corpcall Capital Advisors) held 61.78 per cent of the voting share. Dissenting creditors say they are connected to the guarantor; his side says they belong to his brother, whose business separated from his in 2008–09, as BusinessToday reports. I take no view on the facts. The point is arithmetic: on the vote table in the order, without those five votes the plan would have had roughly 46 per cent of the votes cast (less if two unsupported claim-holders are also removed), far short of the more-than-three-fourths that section 111 requires. Classification could affect the outcome.
The Tribunal split on exactly that classification. Section 109(4)(b) bars only an “associate” of the debtor from voting, and section 79(2)(g) makes a company an associate where “the debtor or the debtor along with his associates” own more than fifty per cent of its shares or control its board. The original bench’s Judicial Member read this literally: the guarantor himself held no shares, so none of the five met the ownership threshold. The Technical Member read it purposively: a company controlled by an associate, here the guarantor’s brother’s wife, should not escape through a corporate shell. The Third Member, as reported, held that the statutory test for associate status had not been made out.
A nil vote still needs a definition
Proposal 1 reaches for the wider concept of “related party” in section 5(24A) and assigns it a nil voting share, relying on section 109(2), under which the Board specifies how voting shares are determined. The purpose is sound: in Phoenix ARC[1], the Supreme Court recognised that connected creditors can distort the process. Three problems remain.
First, text. Section 5(24A)(i) catches a company where “the individual or the individual along with its related party” holds over fifty per cent, the same “along with” formula on which the Tribunal divided. A company held wholly by a relative may therefore provoke the same dispute. Clauses (f) and (h), which turn on whose instructions a body corporate or individual follows, avoid the shareholding test but are matters of evidence. A regulation cannot amend a statutory definition; that fix belongs with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs.
Second, vires. Section 109(4) itself lists who may not vote: creditors absent from the list, and associates. Whether the Board can widen that class through its power over the manner of fixing voting share is at least arguable. Subordinate legislation is tested against the enabling Act’s object and scheme, with courts cautious about striking it down on that ground alone P. Krishnamurthy[2]. The paper cites sections 109(2) and 240(2)(zq) but does not engage the point.
Third, proof. The paper adds only a column to the list of creditors flagging related-party status; who decides, on what evidence, and when is left open. The Technical Member’s opinion records objectors’ contention that their objections were answered only after voting closed, on the guarantor’s own confirmations. That is an allegation, but it locates the choke point.
Information without entitlement
In CIRP, dissenting financial creditors have a statutory floor, enforced in Essar Steel[3], and re-cast by the 2026 Amendment Act as section 30(2)(ba). I could find no counterpart in sections 105 to 115. A repayment plan needs more than three-fourths in value of creditors voting; the Tribunal approves or rejects it “on the basis of” the RP’s report on the creditors’ meeting (section 114(1)); once approved, it binds the creditors mentioned in it (section 115(1)). The 2026 Amendment Act amended other parts of Part III (section 106, new section 164A) but, I found, not sections 109 to 115. The only numerical guard I found, regulation 17(1)(c), is an income test: at least ten per cent of realisable income towards debts.
That makes valuation the hinge. The RP told the Tribunal that the guarantor’s estate might not cover even the expenses of bankruptcy, and that Judicial Member reasoned that dissenting creditors therefore stood to gain nothing by forcing it (both recorded in the order). Proposal 3, an independent registered valuer, strengthens the hinge. Proposal 4 will record the reasons of the majority, which in a case like this may include the very creditors whose eligibility is disputed. Neither gives a dissenting creditor anything to enforce. And the trigger for specific reasons, a payout “significantly lower” than admitted claims or realisable value, is undefined: measured against admitted claims, any plan paying a fraction of them would meet it.
One drafting point on Proposal 2. The paper says the RP would act on avoidance transactions “with the approval of the creditors”, but draft regulation 10A(3) says he “shall take such action” a bankruptcy trustee could take, with no approval requirement. Sections 164, 165 and 167 vest the application power in the bankruptcy trustee, and draft 10A(2) transposes their look-back references through an “as if” clause. That is a large step for a regulation and invites the same vires question.
After 23 September: The Appeal, the FIR and an Unfinished Draft
Three developments since the Special Bench sought the CBI's response bear directly on the proposals: the dispute has reached the appellate tribunal, a criminal complaint now shadows the valuation question, and the IBBI consultation has closed.
The dispute moves to the appellate tribunal
On 29 September a three-member NCLAT bench issued notices on Chandra's appeal against the 1 September order of the five-member NCLT bench. Creditors who question the appeal's maintainability must respond within a week, after which Chandra has a week to reply. At the Solicitor General's request, a separate creditors' petition against the plan's approval was clubbed with Chandra's appeal, and interim-relief arguments are fixed for 29 and 30 October, one day for each side. The Solicitor General proposed waiting for the five-member NCLT bench's hearing on 19 November; Chandra's counsel opposed this.
What is being argued, as reported, is notable for what it leaves out. Chandra contends that the 1 September order exceeded jurisdiction and challenges how the five-member bench was constituted. His lawyer had earlier argued that the Tribunal is not an appellate court. The creditors, for their part, question maintainability. These are questions of forum and power. On the reports I have seen, none concerns whether the five entities should have voted at all.
That is the pattern the earlier part of this analysis anticipated. Where the Code gives dissenting creditors no substantive floor, the contest migrates to process, meaning who may review whom and when, while the question the IBBI paper raises (who counts as connected) waits behind it. There is also a timing consequence. Unless drafted otherwise, a regulation would ordinarily operate prospectively, so even a quick notification should not be expected to decide this plan. The proposals are best read as a response to the lessons of the case, not a remedy within it.
The FIR and the valuation hinge
The CBI has registered an FIR on a complaint by LIC Housing Finance Limited (LICHFL). The complaint alleges that inflated net-worth certificates helped secure two loans totalling ₹980 crore, and that the subsequent default caused the lender a loss above ₹1,322 crore. The FIR also records that, during the insolvency proceedings, Chandra denied having the net worth stated in those certificates and put his 2024 net worth at ₹31.79 crore. These are allegations in a complaint, and I take no view on them. Their relevance is structural.
Earlier it is noted that the RP told the Tribunal that the guarantor's estate might not cover even the expenses of bankruptcy, and that this reasoning supported the view that dissenting creditors had nothing to gain by forcing it. Alongside the FIR, the case now presents two very different pictures of the guarantor's wealth, one in a repayment plan and one in a criminal complaint. The "significantly lower" test, the section 178 comparison and every creditor's vote depend on which picture is closer to the truth. That is the strongest argument for Proposal 3. An independent registered valuer, determining fair and realisable values in a report that accompanies the plan, is precisely the control this situation calls for.
The FIR also shows where Proposals 2 and 3 stop short. A valuer works largely from what the guarantor discloses. The five-member bench itself accepted that the CBI's enquiry may have a bearing on the case, and gave the agency four weeks to respond. As I read the paper, nothing in it addresses what follows if investigative findings on asset disclosure surface after creditors have voted, or after approval. And because the FIR concerns representations made to a lender rather than a transaction of the kind the avoidance provisions target, Proposal 2's examination of preferential, undervalued, fraudulent or extortionate transactions may not reach it. The final regulations should therefore say how a valuation report must treat pending investigations and disputed disclosures, and the RP's report on the creditors' meeting should record them.
Where the draft stands
The consultation closed on 3 October. The paper is a set of proposals, and any binding change needs a later final regulatory action. I found no extension and no final regulations as on 5 October. Meanwhile the litigation calendar is crowded. The CBI's four-week window from 23 September runs to about 21 October, the NCLAT hears interim-relief arguments on 29 and 30 October, and the five-member bench is due to meet on 19 November.
The Board may therefore finalise its regulations while the case that prompted them is still live. That is no reason to delay, but it raises the stakes of getting the definitional and vires questions right the first time. A regulation assigning a nil vote on a reading later held to exceed section 109(4) would reproduce the present disputes at scale. The Ministry's task of aligning "along with" in sections 79(2)(g) and 5(24A)(i) becomes more important for the same reason, because it is the one fix that does not invite a vires challenge.
What the Final Regulations Still Need
Four asks follow. (1) The Ministry should align the “along with” wording in section 79(2)(g) and section 5(24A)(i) so that a company controlled by the debtor’s associates or related parties, alone or together, is caught. (2) The final regulation should require the RP’s related-party classification to be reasoned, circulated with the list of creditors, and open to objection before the vote. (3) The RP’s report on the meeting should compare the payout with realisable value and the section 178 bankruptcy waterfall; “significantly lower” should give way to an objective trigger; and Parliament should consider a dissenting-creditor floor for Chapter III on the CIRP model. (4) Draft regulation 10A(3) should be conformed to the paper’s stated intent, and its transposition of sections 164 to 167 justified.
Nothing here is a finding on the pending case. But whatever the Tribunal decides, the question for IBBI is whether the guarantor process should mirror CIRP in its protections as well as its procedures. A nil vote is a procedure. A floor is a protection.
CONCLUSION
The IBBI's September proposals identify real gaps. Importing a nil vote, avoidance-transaction scrutiny, independent valuation and recorded reasons from CIRP is the right instinct, and the Chandra litigation shows why: the plan carried on votes whose eligibility was contested, and the Tribunal itself divided on what the statute permits.
Yet the proposals are not yet equal to the problem. The nil vote depends on a definition of "related party" that repeats the "along with" formula which split the Tribunal, and the Board's source of power under section 109(2) may be tested against section 109(4). The paper gives dissenting creditors information but, unlike corporate insolvency, no enforceable floor. Events since 23 September reinforce both points. The dispute has moved to the appellate tribunal on questions of jurisdiction and maintainability, and a CBI FIR alleging inflated net worth has made the guarantor's asset picture itself contested.
Four steps follow. The Ministry should align the "along with" wording in sections 79(2)(g) and 5(24A)(i). The final regulation should require a reasoned, circulated and contestable related-party classification before the vote. The RP's report should compare the payout with realisable value and the section 178 waterfall, replace "significantly lower" with an objective trigger, and address pending investigations, while Parliament considers a dissenting-creditor floor for Chapter III. Draft regulation 10A(3) should be conformed to the paper's stated intent, with its transposition of sections 164 to 167 justified.
Nothing here is a finding on the pending case, and the FIR remains an allegation. But whatever the NCLAT and the Tribunal decide, the question for the IBBI is whether the guarantor process should mirror CIRP in its protections as well as its procedures. A nil vote is a procedure. A floor is a protection.
References
[1]Phoenix ARC Pvt. Ltd. v. Spade Financial Services Ltd., (2021) 3 SCC 475
[2]State of T.N. v. P. Krishnamurthy, (2006) 4 SCC 517
[3]Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2020) 8 SCC 531





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